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Toward Global Democracy: Thoughts in Response
to the Rising Tide of Nation-to-Nation
Interdependencies
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1. J URGEN HABFERMAS, L'Atat-Nation Europien: Passr et Avenir dela Souverainetr et de la Citoyen-
neti, in L'INT1GRATION RiPUBLICAINE: EssAIs DE TH]ORIE POLITIQUE 95, 115 (Rainer Rochlitz
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"[Institutions at the international level need] to look through [their] member
nations into the eyes of the world's peoples."2
INTRODUCTION
Accompanying the growing intensity of globalization, nation-to-nation
interdependencies are on the rise, meaning that events and decisions in one
nation increasingly have effects in other nations. At times, these interdependen-
cies are negative, such as a recession that travels to North America after the onset
of an economic bust in the Far East. Yet although nations' destinies are increas-
ingly interconnected, their populations do not communicate with one another
prior to making collective decisions, although those same decisions might nega-
tively impact another nation. National democratic institutions are generally de-
signed in ways that only allow citizens to vote in elections and to send
representatives to legislatures, allowing no guarantee that the views of foreign
populations will be considered. In fact, no national democracy has ever allowed
foreigners to vote or send voting representatives to its legislature.
In light of increasing interdependencies among states, it has become impor-
tant to design a system of global' democracy. Such a system could provide na-
tional populations with opportunities to communicate with one another that
would allow them collectively to minimize negative interdependencies. With-
out a new design, national populations will continue to impose their will (or the
effects of their decisions) on other nations, in turn reducing their potential for
national autonomy.
In this article, I discuss the possibility of designing an international demo-
cratic system. Since my project is to design institutions, it differs from the work
of such scholars as Anne-Marie Slaughter.4 Slaughter has written extensively on
how nations influence and create interdependencies with one another at the
global level, noting the interlocking effects on legal and political structures and
2. Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, in Symposium, Global Trade Issues in the New Millen-
nium, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 451,472 (2001).
3. I use the words "global" and "international" interchangeably, to denote phenomena occur-
ring between or among nations and beyond the scope of national boundaries-I do not use "inter-
national" strictly in the legal sense of bilateral or multilateral international treaties.
4. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World, 76 FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct.
1997, at 183, 183-84 [hereinafter The Real New World]; ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD
ORDER (2004).
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relationships. She focuses on describing events occurring at the global level,
whereas mine is a normative project, attempting to re-design the operations of
the global level. She, for example, argues that
the state ... is disaggregating into its separate parts, functionally
distinct parts. These parts-courts, regulatory agencies, execu-
tives, and even legislatures-are networking with their counter-
parts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a
new, transgovernmental order. Today's international problems-
terrorism, organized crime, environmental degradation, money
laundering, bank failure, and securities fraud-created and sus-
tain these relations.
5
Slaughter thus documents trends and phenomena occurring at the global
level. My approach, while in factual agreement with Slaughter about increasing
interdependencies, has a prescriptive turn. My approach suggests new struc-
tures-new institutions-designed to deal effectively with the rise of nation-to-
nation interdependencies.
One way to move to a more legitimate international legal system that ad-
dresses the rise of interdependencies is to facilitate national populations' com-
munication with one another. In other words, greater communication helps to
move toward a democracy that includes the populations of all nations, linking
them together.6 Indeed, there is a growing scholarly literature pointing to the
need for a democratic conception of international relations and law, supple-
mented with the fact that a tide of democratic change has swept the world.7 As
represented in the quotation above, the political philosopher Jiirgen Habermas
5. The Real New World, supra note 4, at 184.
6. 1 use the terms "national populations" and "populations of nations" interchangeably. The
term "populations of nations" connotes a disaggregated set of persons--of citizens inside the
nation-state, so I refer to them as populations of nations. However, these words are not to be con-
fused with the word "nation," which is a more general term, potentially including the population
of the nation-state, while also including the "state" as a political body.
7. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS ch. 4
(1995) [hereinafter FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW]; MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION
IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE NEW DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS (1982). See also Thomas
Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) [hereinafter
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance]; D.A. Rustow, Democracy: A Global Revolution?, 69
FOREIGN AFF. 75 (1990).
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laments the absence of international democracy, after the great historical quest
nations have undergone to achieve national democracy. Why not then consider
democratic structures as a basis for international governance?
Several international relations theorists, political philosophers, and democ-
racy scholars have attempted to reorient the literature on international relations,
and contemplate the institutional implementation of international democracy.
These include David Held, Thomas Franck, Michael Reisman, and Habermas.
Michael Barkun in the 1960s and Joseph Weiler in 2000 cautioned scholars not to
"adopt national or domestic analogies" as a starting point or explanatory model
for the international level;8 scholars generally disregard this advice.9
In light of these points, the goal of this article is to make design proposals to
democratize the international level in the same way as Franck, who refers to in-
ternational design as "rethinking structure."'" The renowned social science phi-
losopher Mario Bunge points out that the project of institutional design
presupposes an understanding of the problems of current institutions, and that it
is an "imaginative yet potentially feasible vision of society" that allows for ad-
vancements in social relations."
Although I say that I intend to explore institutional design, 12 it is most defi-
nitely not my intent to evaluate all our contemporary "international" structures,
indicate their problems, and recommend some possible proposals that could po-
tentially stimulate alternative designs of the international system. In other words,
while the ultimate goal is to design a complete, justified, and democratic set of in-
ternational institutions, this article is meant solely to start the engine, rather than
arrive at a final destination. And, as a starting point I argue that any design pro-
posals for international democracy should preserve the autonomy of nations, yet
allow the world's national populations to communicate with one another.
8. See generally MICHAEL BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES
AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 10-12 (1968). See JOSEPH H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE
264 (1999).
9. More specifically, when scholars speculate about international democratic institutions, they
tend to favor designs that are similar to existing national legislatures. In other words, they call for
a single assembly, with representatives elected from each nation in the world.
10. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 481.
11. See MARIO BUNGE, SOCIAL SCIENCE UNDER DEBATE: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 439-41
(1999).
12. 1 use the terms "institution design" and "institutional design" interchangeably.
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The most typical, yet perhaps least realistic, institutional design suggestion
is to establish a world government or single global assembly. Rather than de-
velop a democracy for all nations in a single global assembly, it might be more
appropriate to develop democracy by linking (either among or between) 3 na-
tional populations without bringing them together under a single roof, where
smaller nations might be overwhelmed by larger ones and prompted to cede
their sovereignty. Linked national populations, by contrast, have the opportu-
nity to "look into each other's eyes." This distinction might at first seem to be
trivial, but after working and reflecting on this question for over a year, I con-
sider this linkage of populations to be a key requirement for institutional design.
Elucidating this notion is the goal of this article.
In Part I, I describe what I mean by interdependencies, and then describe
what type of legitimacy and structural criteria are required to begin to think
about international institution design.
In Part II, I first describe the two design criteria I use when thinking about
democratic international institution design; the first is that the autonomy of
nations should be preserved, and the second is that the division, referred to most
notably by Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss as "bifurcation," that separates the
populations of nations from each other should be reduced or eliminated. In Part
II.B, I describe some of the more prominent paradigms of international democ-
racy, and evaluate their potential to address the design criteria set out in the
preceding section. I conclude with Habermas' public deliberation model of de-
mocracy and use it as a guide to inspire democratic institution design.
Finally, in Part III, I discuss several design proposals. I begin by exploring
ways to conceive of international systems, and conclude that the development of
a system that respects the political and cultural autonomy of nations, while still
permitting active and productive connections linking nations' populations,
should be the general goal of international institution design. These ideas should
be seen as a starting point, a work in progress, to begin to think about alternative
international institutions.
13. In this article, I typically use the words "between" populations of nations when referring to
the separation (bifurcation) that exists between national populations as a result of the state-centric
international system. When I attempt to remedy the problem, bringing national populations to-
gether, I typically refer to them as "linking" together.
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I. A CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC DESIGN: A WAY TO COPE
WITH NATION-To-NATION INTERDEPENDENCIES
In the past, nations of the world were less interdependent than they are to-
day. Globalization has altered that earlier pattern, essentially tying the destinies
of separate nations together. 4 As one commentator states, globalization is a pro-
cess "extending the determinative frameworks of social change to the world as a
whole."' 5 This is reflected in Habermas' description of globalization: "La con-
densation de relations &ablies a l'6chelle mondiale, par suite de laquelle certains
6vbnements locaux, tres 61oign~s les uns des autres, exercent les uns sur les autres
une action r&iproque." [The condensing of relationships established on a global
scale, after which certain local events, each very far away from one another, all
exercise one on top of the other a reciprocal action.] 6
Globalization processes have produced an unprecedented degree of intercon-
nectedness, and therefore, produced a dependency between nations, which I in-
terchangeably refer to as international dependencies or interdependencies.1
7
These global interdependencies potentially have significant positive and negative
effects. The positive benefits include facilitation of technical and social creativity,
the spread of beneficial technologies, the understanding of cultures, the growth of
economies,18 etc. 9 Legal scholars such as Slaughter see evidence of "judicial glo-
balization" in an increasing amount of constitutional cross-fertilization, whereby
14. See, e.g., Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and
the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014 (1996-97); DAVID KNOKE, POLITI-
CAL NETWORKS: THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE 76-81 (1990).
15. Zdravko Mlinar, Individuation and Globalization: The Transformation of Territorial Social Or-
ganization, in GLOBALIZATION AND TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES 15, 19 (Zdravko Mlinar ed., 1992).
16. HABERMAS, SUpra note 1, at 111-12. See also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MO-
DERNITY 64 (1990); ANTHONY GIDDENS, BEYOND LEFT AND RIGHT 78 (1994).
17. See DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMO-
POLITAN GOVERNANCE 16-17 (1995). See generally AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE CUL-
TURAL LOGICS OF TRANSNATIONALITY 214 (1999).
18. See Gilles Bourque et al., L'Incorporation de la Citoyenneti, 31 SOCIOLOGIE ET SOCIftTS 41
(Automne 1999); Robert Wolfe, Embedded Liberalism as a Transformation Curve: Comment, in THE
NATION STATE IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ERA: POLICY CHALLENGES 83 (Thomas J. Courchene ed.,
1997); Mark W. Zacher, The Global Economy and the International Political Order: Some Diverse and
Paradoxical Relationships, in THE NATION STATE IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ERA: POLICY CHAL-
LENGES, supra, at 67.
19. See Daniel M. Downs & Richard Janda, Virtual Citizenship, 13 CAN. J. L. & Soc'Y 27 (1998).
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courts look for guidance in the decisions of constitutional courts around the
world.2"
Some scholars cite examples of interdependencies that seem particularly
useful, or at least neutral, for national populations. However, some interdepen-
dencies can be very destructive if uncontrolled. Consider ecological issues, or the
new forms of exploitation, inequality, and de-solidarization generated by an in-
tensely competitive globalized market.2
Global interdependencies, both of the good and the bad variety, are by def-
inition experienced between nations, such that if the economy of nation X is
performing poorly or well, it has direct and indirect effects on the economy of
nation Y. Such interdependencies have been cultural as much as they have been
economic. For example, consider ethnic strife, which, when it occurs in a
particular nation, has the potential to destabilize a region and spread to other
22nations.
As a result of these interdependencies, doubts have emerged about the abil-
ity of nations to exclusively control developments directly affecting their citi-
zens' lives; the legitimacy of international relations thus has become an issue of
central concern. In order to manage new interdependencies, nations will likely
have to work together through international institutions, both to curb negative
effects, as well as properly distribute positive effects, and thereby protect their
mutual autonomies. 23 One commentator closely reflects this thought:
The globalization of the world economy, the ever closer knitting
of the world together through telecommunications, the Internet,
global popular culture, mass travel and tourism, the global nature
20. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1115 (2000) (citing
Nanus Asia Co. v. Standard Charter Bank, 1988 H.K.C. LEXIS 410, at *1, *8 (High Ct. Sept. 22,
1988)).
21. See Roderick A. MacDonald, Entre l'Efficience de Justinien et la Justice de Locke, 41 LES
CAHIERS DE DROIT 171 (2000); ONG, supra note 17, at 214-17; Robert Wolfe, Embedded Liberalism as
a Transformation Curve: Comment, in THE NATION STATE IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ERA: POLICY
CHALLENGES, supra note 18, at 83; Zacher, supra note 18, at 67.
22. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1973); ROGERS BRUBAKER,
CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (1992); JEAN L. COHEN, CLASS AND CIVIL
SOCIETY: THE LIMITS OF THE MARXIAN CRITICAL THEORY (1987); MAURIZIO VIROLI, FOR LOVE OF
COUNTRY (1995).
23. See Part II infra, for the meaning of autonomy in this context.
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of problems such as environmental degradation and control, in-
ternational drugs, crime and terrorism, the global movement of
capital, labor, and their attendant periodic contagions and crises,
and the interdependence of economies, states, and peoples will
give rise to never ending pressures to develop viable global pro-
cesses and institutions to cope with such globalization and inter-
dependenc[ies].24
To cope with these interdependencies, global processes and institutions
would have to be designed. Such (hypothetical) global institutions would have to
be legitimate, as Robert Sheppard points out when he states that:
[O]n the basis of free flows of capital and goods, accompanied by
occasional crises uch as the recent Asian Economic Crisis, national
governments now realize there is no way to establish independent
24. Robert Sheppard, Towards a U.N. World Parliament: U.N. Reform for the Progressive Evolu-
tion ofan Elective and Accountable Democratic Parliamentary Process in U.N. Governance in the New
Millennium, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & PoL'Y J. 19 (2000), available at http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/pdfs/
04-sheppard.pdf. See also HELDsUpra note 17, at 16-17. Held states:
The very process of governance can escape the reach of the nation-state. Nation[-
states] by no means exclusively make and determine decisions and policies for them-
selves, and governments by no means determine what is appropriate exclusively for
their own citizens .... To make some topical examples: a decision to increase inter-
est rates in an attempt to stem inflation or exchange rate instability is most often
taken as a 'national' decision, although it may well stimulate economic changes in
other countries. A decision to permit the 'harvesting' of the rainforests may contrib-
ute to ecological damage far beyond the borders which formally limit the responsi-
bility of a given set of political decision-makers. A decision to build a nuclear plant
near the frontiers of a neighboring country is a decision likely to be taken without
consulting those in the nearby country (or countries), despite the many risks and
ramifications for them. A decision by a government to save resources by suspending
food aid to a nation may stimulate the sudden escalation of food prices in that nation
and contribute directly to an outbreak of famine among the urban and rural poor.
These decisions, along with policies on issues as diverse as investment, arms pro-
curement, and AIDS, are typically regarded as falling within the legitimate domain
of authority of a sovereign nation-state. Yet, in a world of regional and global inter-
connectedness [and interdependencies], there are major questions to be put about
the ... viability and accountability of national decision-making entities themselves.
TOWARD GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
national strategies in economic and social fields and to ignore the
rest of the world and the interdependency of the global economy.
Nation-states will increasingly need to manage such interdepen-
dency such that they are advantaged [(through positive interde-
pendencies)] rather than victimized by it [(through negative
interdependencies)] and will need to form new and reliable insti-
tutions of cooperation and governance to deal with realities be-
yond their control that may otherwise cripple them. Those
institutions will [have to produce] ... global legitimacy .... 25
Furthermore, this need for global institutions is not specific to nations of a
particular size or power, as stated in Sheppard's quotation, given that interde-
pendencies are arguably intense enough to affect both small and large nations
alike, even if not necessarily equal in intensity. Michael Reisman mirrors this
when he states that
though the world of big and small and strong and weak states...
persists, the sharp asymmetries of 1945 have given way to complex
international interdependencies. In this new world ... arrange-
ments [at the international level] ... require more and more coop-
eration between large and small states.
26
Indeed, coping with globalization and global interdependence requires insti-
tutions that would further and enhance international cooperation, but more than
that, it requires appropriate international governance institutions, which allow
nations to collaborate together to collectively control and effectively distribute
negative and positive interdependencies.27 As Sheppard states, there is a need for
greater global legitimacy. But there are many types of legitimacy. Which type
would be most suitable? What are the central criteria for the design of global, le-
gitimate institutions? I turn to these questions in the following sections.
25. Sheppard,supra note 24, at 7-8.
26. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 83 (1993).
27. See Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2056 (2003) (stating that "glo-
balization has brought both positive and negative effects, and that these have not been evenly dis-
tributed across and within nation states.") (emphasis omitted).
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A. Interdependencies and Legitimacy
Because nation-to-nation interdependencies have created a need to think
about legitimacy, I next examine the idea of legitimacy and decide what defini-
tion of it is appropriate in the context of institution design. I do this to guide my
discussion of institution design, since how one characterizes legitimacy is likely
to have downstream effects on how an institution is designed.
There are many types of governance-consider monarchy, authoritarian-
ism, and democracy.28 Theories of legitimacy attempt to specify what factors
might serve as justifications for these types: tradition, rationality, legality, order,
and of course, democracy, to name a few.
29
The term "legitimacy" has been used in various ways and so it is important
to explain what is meant by it here. Sometimes "legitimacy" connotes "genuine-
ness." Consider for example when someone says that "the situation in Rwanda is
a legitimate emergency." But legitimacy is also used to connote "justification," as
when someone points out that a person "raised a legitimate concern." Such a
statement means that this person is justified in saying whatever it is he said.3"
When referring to legitimacy, I mean it in the latter sense of being justified.
There are many definitions of legitimacy that are based on the idea of justifica-
tion. Consider Habermas's definition: "Legitimacy means that there are good
arguments for a political order's claim to be recognized as right and just; a legit-
imate order deserves recognition. Legitimacy means a political order's worthi-
ness to be recognized."'"
Although there are many other definitions of legitimacy,32 it seems that
Habermas's represents a definition that is consistent with the project of this
28. See generally Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Chal-
lengefor International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596 (1999) (discussing the system of
democracy).
29. Id. at 601.
30. See id. at 600 n.26 (defining legitimacy as "genuine" and "justified").
31. JORGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 178 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1979) (emphasis omitted).
32. See Bodansky,supra note 28, at 601 n.29 (discussing representative definitions of legitimacy);
ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 103 (1977) (legiti-
macy is the ability "to command acceptance and support from the community so as to render force
unnecessary"); ROBERT A. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 41 (2d ed. 1970) ("A government is
said to be 'legitimate' if the people to whom its orders are directed believe that the structure,
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article. The argument laid out above is that as a result of the increasing rise of
nation-to-nation interdependencies, there is a need to rethink international
structures and design alternative ones. The argument is that it is not just that
some national populations are the recipients of the consequences of another na-
tion-state's decisions and actions (whether or not they were intended). In in
Habermas' words, such a system does not "deserve recognition" as a legitimate
order that is both "right and just."33
Of course, it is one thing to claim that an order is illegitimate, but it is alto-
gether another to say what system should replace it (what system deserves recog-
nition). Indeed, this is one of the central topics of this article-to outline what
criteria should be considered when designing institutions for the international
level. As we will see, these include democracy, the preservation of national au-
tonomy, and the shrinking of the divide between the populations of nations.
Institutional legitimacy is also referred to as "process legitimacy" by scholars
such as Thomas Franck, who view institutions as part of a "rule-making...
process."34 The project of redesigning institutions' processes in response to the il-
legitimacy (or reduced legitimacy) of currently existing institutions is sometimes
referred to as "making [institutional] reforms" 35 or "designing" institutions.36
procedures, acts, decisions, policies, officials or leaders of government possess the quality of 'right-
ness,' propriety or moral goodness - the right, in short, to make binding rules."); SEYMOUR MAR-
TIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 77 (1960) (legitimacy means "the
capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions
are the most appropriate ones for the society"); Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, 14 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 3, 5 (1985) (stating that institutions have "legitimate authority only if and to the extent
that their claim [to have a right to rule] is justified"). But cf THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LE-
GITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) (examining the effective authority of individual legal norms,
rather than the justification of international institutions or decision-making processes).
33. Id.
34. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAwsupra note 7, at ch. 2. Process legitimacy is typically pit-
ted against "substantive legitimacy": where the former refers to how rules come to be, the latter is
about the content of such rules. Process legitimacy does not depend on whether a rule or decision
is substantively correct (judged by whatever standard); rather, it reflects more general support for
a regime, which makes subjects willing to substitute the regime's decisions for their own evalua-
tion of a situation. Hence, process legitimacy refers to ongoing systems of governance---on the in-
stitutions that issue directives, and the processes by which they do so-rather than on the
legitimacy of particular directives.
35. Mario Bunge uses the expression "making reforms" and "reform" interchangeably with
"making institutional changes" or "changes." See BUNGE,supra note 11, at 442-43.
36. See W. Michael Reisman, Redesigning the United Nations, 1 SING. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1, 8
(1997).
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Consider David Caron's work arguing that the United Nations Security Council
lacks legitimacy, since it does not represent the nations of the world, but repre-
sents only a few members: fifteen members are on the Council, ten are rotating,
and five members are permanent, each enjoying the power to veto a potential
resolution.37 There are also more sweeping arguments for change. Consider
Franck, who recommends that the United Nations General Assembly be trans-
formed into a two-chamber body, one that that contains representatives ap-
pointed by states similar to the way that it is constituted at present, and a second
chamber that contains representatives that are directly elected in accordance
with universal suffrage and democratic principles.
Although "institutional legitimacy" is, as Franck describes, based on "pro-
cess," it is inextricably related to the substantive legitimacy of the rules that the
institution is likely to produce, since rules emerge from the interactions and pro-
cesses of an institution.38 This type of legitimacy is typically referred to as "rule
legitimacy."39 Rule legitimacy is the notion that rules are seen as legitimate if
they are a product of a legitimate process.4" Hence, discussion about institutional
legitimacy is also partly a discussion of rule legitimacy--considering that how
the institution operates and is seen is likely to have effects on how its rules are
seen from a legitimacy perspective.4' Franck agrees, stating that the "legitimacy
in the rules... [is dependent on] the way they are made," 42 even if this goes too
far in ignoring the self-standing legitimacy of rules from a substantive point of
view.
B. Two Types of Institutional Legitimacy
When discussing institutional legitimacy, it is important to mention that it
can be seen to have both a descriptive, sociological, or popular 43 and a normative,
37. See generally David Caron, Governance and Collective Legitimation in the New World Order, 6
HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 29 (1993).





42. Thomas Franck, WhyA Questfor Legitimacy?, 21 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 535 (1988).
43. This type of legitimacy is referred to as descriptive legitimacy, popular legitimacy, or socio-
logical legitimacy. I use these words interchangeably.
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evaluative, or prescriptive" dimension. Reform is typically associated with an
evaluative legitimacy and so it is important to discuss the idea. To do this,
though, it is equally important to discuss its counterpart, descriptive legitimacy.
Descriptive legitimacy was first described by Max Weber, who saw legiti-
macy as a measure of the belief of the concerned polity in the right of their lead-
ership to lead, no matter how that belief was secured.4" In Habermas' view,
descriptive legitimacy refers to popular attitudes about whether a particular in-
stitution should be recognized as worthy, as right and just.46 The recognition
that an institution is just, if the subjects to whom it is addressed accept it as just,
is popular legitimacy.47 The more positive the public's attitudes about an institu-
tion's right to govern, the greater its popular legitimacy.
On the other hand, institutional legitimacy can also have a normative mean-
ing when the institution's recognition as just is "well founded."48 Normative le-
gitimacy seeks to go beyond the sentiments of people, even if the majority within
society believes something to be legitimate, and to evaluate a particular form of
governance based on specific criteria external to the sentiments and beliefs of the
majority.49 For many scholars who contemplate international legitimacy and re-
form or design of the international system, questions of legitimacy are addressed
in this evaluative sense. Consider the works of Habermas, Held, and Michael
Saward.5 ° In this article, I also adopt an evaluative sense of legitimacy-in fact, I
would argue that developing an institution design requires evaluative legiti-
macy. Since my project is about institution design, it reflects an evaluative legit-
imacy orientation.
44. This type of legitimacy is referred to as normative legitimacy, evaluative legitimacy, or pre-
scriptive legitimacy. I use these terms interchangeably.
45. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth and Claus Whittich eds.,
1978) (1914); I. HOROWITZ, THE NORM OF ILLEGITIMACY-TEN YEARS LATER, LEGITIMATION OF
REGIMES: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 23 (B. Denitch ed., 1979); J. H. SCHAAR,
LEGITIMACY IN THE MODERN STATE 15 (1981).
46. See id.
47. See Bodansky,supra note 28, at 601.
48. Id.
49. See Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent - 11, 60 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 39 (1966) ("Legitimate
authority is precisely that which ought to be obeyed .... ).
50. See generally JLRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975);
David Held, Power and Legitimacy in Contemporary Britain, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPO-
RARY BRITAIN: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 302 (Gregor McLennan et al. eds., 1984); MICHAEL
SAWARD, CO-OPTIVE POLITICS AND STATE LEGITIMACY 33 (1992).
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If institution design is seen through an evaluative legitimacy lens, then it is
essential to determine what the specific criteria are for any design project, before
outlining the actual institutional design. Michael Reisman refers to criteria
based on evaluative institutional legitimacy as "design principles."'"
Design principles (or evaluative legitimacy criteria) may vary, depending on
the political or philosophical system they are based on-from the works of John
Locke and Thomas Jefferson, to the ideas of the Qur'an. Which system one
adopts produces different design principle outputs. In the case of the particular
project of international institution design, the single most important criterion is
that the institutions be democratic. In the design of a democratic institution at
the international level, there are two other criteria that I consider essential, and
that I turn to in the first section of the next part: preserving the political and cul-
tural autonomy of nations, and ensuring that nations' populations are afforded
the opportunity to deliberate with each other. But, for now, let me turn to why
democracy is an important criterion.
C. Democracy as Institutionally Legitimate
As a type of institutional legitimacy, democracy seems to be an ideal design
principle when thinking about the international level. Many scholars today see
legitimacy and democracy as tantamount, and increasingly, the national popula-
tions of the world see it as a "global entitlement."52 And, although dissatisfaction
with democracy is common in Western countries, s3 it is still fair to say that de-
mocracy is seen as legitimate when compared to its alternatives, probably due to
the fact that democracy is seen as "produc[ing] the best results"-either because,
as Jefferson argued, "in the end, the people are wiser than any single individual
51. See Reisman, supra note 36, at 8.
52. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 83-139; POMERANCE, supra note 7;
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, supra note 7, at 46; see also Bodansky, supra note 28, at
599 (discussing how democracy and legitimacy strongly interrelate and are even equated with one
another); Rustow, supra note 7, at 75 (analyzing several recent conversions toward democracy and
suggesting how such democratic changes could be more successful and sustainable). But see Lauri
Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens), in INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT,
CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 375 (1988) ("[O]ne cannot speak of the universal right of dependent
peoples to self-determination.") (emphasis omitted).
53. See Bodansky, supra note 28, at 599. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCON-
TENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996) (discussing the tensions inherent be-
tween democracy in practice and the public philosophy behind democracy).
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can be," or because democracy best aggregates individual interests, as the utili-
tarians believe, thereby maximizing social welfare. 4
Democracy is also a great mechanism for communication. As mentioned
above, the goal of institution design is for nations to find ways to collectively
manage interdependencies. Hence, democracy is ideal, since it allows the popu-
lations of nations to communicate with one another, thereby providing for opti-
mal results. By enabling the population of nations to communicate through
democratic processes, the hope is that they will find ways to reduce or limit neg-
ative interdependencies, while increasing positive ones.
But, in addition to the fact that there is an increasing tide of interdependen-
cies, instituting international democracy is seen by many scholars as an inher-
ently worthy goal. In fact, as far back as 1966, Innis Claude recognized that
popular consent is needed as a legitimizing principle of contemporary interna-
tional political life and not simply national or local political life.55 Since then,
many scholars have acknowledged the necessity of developing a people-centered
or democratic conception of international law.56
54. Bodansky, supra note 28, at 613 (quoting Thomas Jefferson) (citation omitted). "Environ-
mental politics provides empirical support for a substantive justification of democracy since West-
ern liberal democracies have done a demonstrably better job of protecting the environment than
the non-democratic regimes of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." Id. at 613 n.101
(citing Robert Paehlke, Environmental Challenges to Democratic Practice, in DEMOCRACY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 18, 19 (William M. Lafferty & James Meadowcroft eds.,
1996)).
55. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations, 20
INT'L. ORC. 367 (1966). See also Hugo Caminos, Effects of the New World Order on the Third World,
87 AM. SoC'Y INT'L. L. PRoc. 41 (1993); Gibor Kardos, Right to Peace, Right to Development, Right
to a Healthy Environment: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
CHANGING EAST-WEST PERSPECTIVE 216, 220 (Allan Rosas & Jan Helgesen eds., 1990); W. Michael
Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L.
866, 867-68 (1990); Allan Rosas, Internal Self-Determination, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 227 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); Christian Tomuschat, Democratic Plural-
ism: The Right to Political Opposition, in THE STRENGTH OF DIVERSITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACY 27, 40-44 (Allan Rosas & Jan Helgesen eds., 1992).
56. See, e.g., ToM ATHANASIOU, DIVIDED PLANET: THE ECOLOGY OF RICH AND POOR 26 (1996);
Bodansky, supra note 28, at 599 ("[D]emocracy [is] the touchstone of legitimacy in the modern
world.") (emphasis in original); James Crawford, Democracy and International Law, 64 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L. L. 113 (1993); Hilary E French, Strengthening International Governance, 3 J. OF ENV'T. & DEV.
59, 65 (1994); Jochen Abr. Frowein, The European Community and the Requirement of a Republican
Form of Government, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1311, 1322 (1984); Patti Goldman, The Democratization of
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D. Preliminary Definition of Democracy
Whereas Hobbes vested all political power with the sovereign, however
constituted, 57 Locke took a different position, vesting ultimate authority with
the people.5" Inspired by Locke's position, democracy has become the hallmark
of legitimate governance in the modern world.59 Locke's idea of democracy as
"rule by the people" 60 echoes in Franck's definition of democracy. "The term,
democracy, as used in international rights parlance is intended to connote the
kind of governance, which is legitimated by the consent of the governed."'" For
Franck, it is difficult to consider a political institution as "democratic" without
multi-party, regular, free elections based on universal suffrage.62 He sees democ-
racy as based on the will of the people, or the consent of the governed, expressed
the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL I NT'L L. J. 631,643-48 (1994) (question-
ing legitimacy of WTO); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions and the Ero-
sion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1966 (1997) ("If international
institutions are to acquire and exercise the sovereign powers required to respond to the negative
forces of globalism, they... will have to become more democratic."); David A. Wirth, Re-examin-
ing Decision-Making Processes in International Environmental Law, 79 IOWA L. REV. 769, 802 (1994).
57. THOMAS HOBBES, MAN AND CITIZEN 165, 171 (Bernard Gert ed., Charles T. Wood et al.
trans., 1972). See also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Thoemmes, 2003) (1651).
58. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, chap. VIII, para. 95-96 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1960) (1690).
59. See Bodansky, supra note 28, at 612 (stating that democracy is a relatively recent phenome-
non and, that, historically, governments usually claimed some other basis of legitimacy--divine
right, tradition, or rule by the natural elite, to name a few). See also DAVID HELD, MODELS OF
DEMOCRACY (1987); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 1 (1966):
Democracy used to be a bad word. Everybody who was anybody knew that democ-
racy, in its original sense of rule by the people or government in accordance with the
will of the bulk of the people, would be a bad thing-fatal to individual freedom
and to all the graces of civilized living. That was the position taken by pretty nearly
all men of intelligence from the earliest historical times down to about a hundred
years ago.
60. Susan Marks, International Law, Democracy, and the End of History, in DEMOCRATIC GOVER-
NANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 19 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000). See also SUSAN
MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CRITIQUE
OF IDEOLOGY (2000).
61. FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 102, 477-84.
62. It is important not to ignore the fact that suffrage for women, and even for some religious or
racial groups (such as African Americans in the United States), is a recent practice in many de-
mocracies. Thus far, the idea of universal suffrage has not included a nation's 'non-citizens'-
non-citizens are excluded, even if they work, live, or study in a host nation.
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through regular, free elections, in which leaders can be replaced and policies
changed in response to voting processes.
63
The above definition of democracy is only preliminary. In Part II, I come to
a more precise definition of democracy--one that I consider appropriate for
democratic institution design.
II. IN SEARCH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW'S DEMOCRATIC SHOES
In Part II.A, I examine two design principles for global democracy. Then in
Part II.B, I examine different models of international democracy that have been
discussed in the literature and determine whether they fit the design criteria
enumerated and discussed in Part II.A.
A. A Tale of Two Design Principles for Global Democracy
1. The Criterion of National and Cultural Autonomy
The overarching goal of democratic international institution design is to
allow nations the opportunity to manage their mutual interdependencies; in-
creasing their positive interdependencies-the ones they want-while also re-
ducing the negative ones. Hence, one can see this project of institution design as
simultaneously recognizing the results of globalization that tie nations' fates to-
gether, while respecting, and even increasing, the autonomy of nations in light of
these interdependencies. It is for this reason that I generally consider autonomy
a crucial design criterion of democratic international institution design.
In order for hypothetical democratic international institutions effectively to
deal with global interdependencies, it is important that national and cultural au-
tonomy be protected, because national populations and nation-states are gener-
ally wary of institutions that might restrict their autonomy. Hence, democratic
international institutions would have to be designed in ways which assure con-
tinued autonomy of nations, both small and large. I therefore turn to the ques-
tion of national and cultural autonomy.
63. See, e.g., FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 482-84. See also HELD, supra note
17, at 269-74 (proposing the establishment of a directly-elected "independent assembly of demo-
cratic peoples").
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One of the major questions that has emerged in the context of the European
Union (EU), which is bound to become a concern to nations contemplating the
establishment of democratic international institutions, is the fear that that more
powerful societies within the newly formed EU could potentially overpower
smaller nations, thereby destroying their cultural and political autonomy. Con-
sider what Weiler refers to as the Danes' "screams of grief," if Denmark were to
be absorbed by Germany and Danes were consequently bound by the decisions
of the German majority in the Bundestag.64 This is a worry that arises from fear
that larger Member States, by simple reasons of size will dominate the EU,
thereby producing a natural, even if gradual, erosion of cultural autonomy in
smaller nations.65
Europeans typically voice their scepticism about joining the Union in three
ways. First, that "the reach of the community or union into areas which are, or are
thought to be, classical symbolic 'State' functions in relations to which 'Foreigners'
should not be telling 'Us' (French or Danes or Irish, etc.) how to run our lives."'
These areas are socially constructed and culturally bound, and are not fixed. They
range from the less serious (British Pint) to the crucially important and morally
significant (the right-to-life of the Irish abortion saga). Second, that the reach of
the Community or Union into areas which are, or are thought to be, matters left
to individuals or local communities and in relation to which "government" should
not be telling "Us" (the people) how to run their lives. 7 And third, that the "per-
ception, whether or not rooted in reality, that there is no effective limit and/or
check on the ability of the Community or Union to reach into areas previously
thought to be the preserve of the state or of the individual."6
The same fears that Europeans experience with respect to the EU would
likely arise for the populations of nations in the context of establishing interna-
tional democracy, especially if international democracy implies the establish-
ment of a single world state, or huge democratic assemblies, which make the
voices of smaller nations inaudible relative to those of larger, more populated,
nations, or force smaller nations to collaborate to overcome the power of larger
64. See WEILER, SUpra note 8.
65. Id.




nations.69 Either way, this process dilutes the autonomy of large and small na-
tions. In some cases, large nations will likely be overwhelmed (and potentially
outvoted) by the unified support of small nations, but ironically, this would also
dilute the autonomy of smaller nations, which feel they must gain the support of
other nations to overcome larger nations' power,70 thereby, effectively reducing
their authentic voice, and hence, their autonomy.
Although citizens of nations generally see value in communicating with
other nations to ensure peace and stability in the global arena, they are wary of
institutions that require them to cede so much power to a single instance, be-
cause of the risk of loss of their effective independence, or their culture. 7 1 Indeed,
there seems to be consensus, after a long historical period marked by colonial-
ism, that cultural and national values, and the preservation and continued ex-
pression of such values, have intrinsic worth. For the populations of many
nations, these values represent the citizens' sense of being, their identity.
72
69. I see qualifications such as "large" and "small" as being on a spectrum. To be precise, small
nations are nations that have smaller populations when compared to another nation, or simply less
power and influence. When considering these two definitional criteria, one can see Canada as
smaller when compared to the United States. But, one can also see India as smaller than the
United States with reference to military power, but not with respect to national population.
70. See Reisman, supra note 36, at 8 (arguing that it is important to take power into account
when designing political institutions).
71. See FRANCK, supra note 32.
72. See Joseph H. Weiler, To bea European Citizen - Eros and Civilization, in THE CONSTITUTION
OF EUROPE, supra note 8, at 324; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 66, U.N. Doc.A/Res/1514(XV) (1960);
Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59, art. 20; Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, 9 I.L.M.1292; International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360, art. 1; Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, art. 1; see also FRANCK,
supra note 32 (examining the effective authority of individual legal norms); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr.,
The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 306-07 (1994)
(recognizing differing degrees of self-determination, a concept consisting of many variables in-
cluding the right to be free from colonial domination, the right to remain independent, the right
to dissolve a state, the right to secede, the right of divided nations to reunite, the right of limited
autonomy for groups defined territorially or by common ethnic, religious, and linguistic bonds,
the rights of minority groups within a larger political entity, and the right to choose one's own
form of government); The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Res-
olutions, Study prepared by Hector Gros Espiell, the Special Repporteur of the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/
HASSAN EL MENYAWI
Although preserving the culture of nations is important, I do not believe the
goal of protecting the cultures of nations to require that nations exist as sover-
eign totalities-bounded, self-sufficient, exercising uniform control over their
citizen subjects within the boundaries of their territories, with the ability to con-
trol flows across their borders.73 I do, however, believe that nations deserve
space, even in an environment marked by globalization, to preserve their cul-
tural values (particularly those seen as crucial to their population). In other
words, an international democratic structure would ideally permit nations to
make choices or trade-offs about the decision to cede certain parts of their cul-
ture, which are not as highly valued, or whether to protect other parts, which are
considered crucial.
To be sure, the nation-state today still exists and remains "sovereign" in many
respects. Hence, strong versions of the globalization thesis that assert that the
nation-state is an anachronism doomed to go the same way as the early modern
city-state-because it no longer can provide the conditions for the economic well-
being, security, or protection to its subjects-have not come to fruition.74 But the
eager pronouncements of the death of sovereignty itself, as an empirical reality,
also seem inaccurate. The modern state continues to exercise jurisdictional
Rev.1 (1980). See generally Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (determining that the Western Sahara
was a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius) at the time of its colonization by Spain, and that
the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity must
be examined in the context of the social and political organization of the population of the terri-
tory); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966, I.C.J. 6 (July 18) (in which Peti-
tioners, members of the League of Nations, argue that South Africa's use of apartheid violates the
Mandate for South Africa and the Covenant of the League of Nations); Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstand-
ing Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16, at 66-69 (June 21).
73. 1 have provided a description of sovereignty inspired by Krasner, who offers four meanings
or categories of sovereignty: domestic sovereignty (the organization of authority and control
within the state), interdependence sovereignty (the ability to control flows across borders), inter-
national level sovereignty (establishing the status of a political entity in the international system),
and Westphalian sovereignty (preventing external actors from influencing or determining do-
mestic authority structure). These categories overlap and do not co-vary in any necessary pattern.
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 11-25 (1999). See also CONTENDING
SOVEREIGNTIES: REDEFINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY (R. B. J. Walker & Saul H. Mendlovitz eds.,
1990); RICHARD FALK, EXPLORATIONS AT THE EDGE OF TIME (Falk ed., 1992); HELD, supra note 17;
SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
74. See Jean L. Cohen, Rights, Citizenship and the Modern Form of the Social: Dilemmas of
Arendtian Republicanism, in 3 CONSTELLATIONS 164-85 (1996); COHEN, supra note 22.
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authority, the power to sanction, and to legitimately use force vis- -vis those in its
territory.75 Furthermore, state citizenship remains a very important form of mem-
bership for many and includes interconnected issues such as belonging, power, se-
curity, culture, and status.
Hence, one of the goals when contemplating the establishment of international
institutional democracy is to strike a balance between these two ends of the spec-
trum, and to realistically pursue an alternative to either extreme-absolute sover-
eignty on one end of the spectrum, and its antithesis, the total erosion of the nation-
state on the other side. To ensure that nations are "autonomous" in the way that the
legal and political philosopher Joseph Raz defines autonomy-that they have a suf-
ficiently wide space of choices to make 76-requires choices that permit nations to
protect areas that they consider crucial to their culture, and with which they iden-
tify with being a nation, while also allowing them to communicate and coordinate
with other nations.7 7 In my view, this would represent a true exercise of a nation's
autonomy. I consider the preservation of autonomy to be a central goal in the de-
velopment of international democratic institutions, and hence, one specific crite-
rion, to use the language of evaluative institutional legitimacy described above. In
addition to striking the balance between absolute sovereignty and the total erosion
of the state, I prefer discussing 'autonomy' as opposed to 'sovereignty,' considering
that the word 'sovereignty' is typically associated with the absolutist variant--one
that claims national sovereignty stands for complete control over its subjects or cit-
izens, on its internal and external flows across its borders, control over its territory,
and independence from any external interventions. It is for this reason that some
scholars such as Louis Henkin say that "it is time to slowly ease the term [sover-
eignty] out of polite language in international relations, [and] surely in law."78
Although Raz's definition of autonomy is not directly about nations or the
international system, it is easily applicable in such a context. For him, autonomy
consists of the ability to make choices-more precisely, the ability to make
choices within "an adequate range of options." 79 For him, it is not about achiev-
ing total control, but rather, being able to make choices.8" Currently, nations find
75. See COHEN, Supra note 22.
76. What constitutes a "sufficient" space is primarily determined on an intuitive basis.
77. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 370-98 (1986).
78. Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY: THE CHALLENGE OF A
CHANGING WORLD, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 16 (1992).
79. See RAZ, supra note 77, at 391.
80. See id. at 381
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themselves having to deal with the effects of globalization, and their choices are
increasingly being restricted, without their having to make trade-offs (on differ-
ent issues) themselves. Rather, such choice restrictions are the result of global
forces, which both small and large nations simply cannot control. As Raz states
with concern, "changing technologies, economic and social conditions" 81 make
autonomy a central issue to consider. 2
Autonomy for Raz is the ability to "freely or deliberately [choose] from
among various alternatives."" In other words, at an international level, auton-
omy consists of the ability to make trade-offs and determine how to relate with
other nations, as well as determine which areas a population is willing to collab-
orate on and reconcile with other nations' populations, and which areas they
choose not to compromise-areas where there will likely be limited negotiation,
since these are seen as crucial to national identity. This idea negates the image of
a sovereign nation with absolute control over its territory, and its citizens, vis-a-
vis other nations of the world-it is a more realistic version perhaps in an era
marked by globalization. Hence, rather than protection and preservation of all
facets of a nation's culture and territory, the goal of international institutional
design is to allow nations the ability to understand the choices available to them,
and then make decisions, or, perhaps more aptly, to make trade-offs (between
competing values and concerns).
I have referred to political and cultural autonomy. I consider culture to be a
more general concept, which includes the political domain, and hence, political
autonomy is part of cultural autonomy. To further explain what I mean by po-
litical and cultural autonomy, I look to Mario Bunge's definition of culture. Cul-
ture is a broad concept, and includes such elements "as language, stories,
knowledge (in particular science, technology, and the humanities), art, morality,
and ideology-including religion .... Thus conceived, a culture is a concrete
system, [and] not a bunch of disembodied ideas."84
One can argue, as Bunge does, that politics and political structures are inex-
tricably connected to culture. 85 He says that "politics cannot be properly under-
stood without analysing both the concepts and the powers of ideology,
81. Id. at 369-70.
82. Id. at 370.
83. Id. at 369.
84. BUNCE, supra note 11, at 219.
85. See id. at 218.
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technology, and communication.... Hence, the need to connect political science
with cultur[e]."'86 Social psychologists Fathali Moghaddam, Donald Taylor, and
Stephen Wright define culture in a similarly broad manner, pointing out that
culture is "the human-made part of the environment," "a combination of both
social and material products of humankind, [including] material products such
as roads, bridges, cooking pots, and military weapons [as well as] musical sym-
phonies, poetry, and other social products." 87
In other words, Moghaddam, Taylor, and Wright would see political struc-
tures as part of culture, considering that culture is the social or material product
of humans. And so if we adopt this definition of culture, then cultural autonomy
consists of making choices and trade-offs in the broad, overlapping areas men-
tioned above.
It can be argued that my having made the preservation of a nation's auton-
omy important obfuscates the goal of designing international democratic insti-
tutions with protecting national autonomy. In my view, pursuing the goal of
preserving nations' autonomy does not necessarily impede the pursuit of inter-
national institutional design. In fact, it can also be argued that populations of
nations are less likely to participate in, or even consider legitimate (or insuffi-
ciently legitimate) institutions that do not demonstrably convince them that
their autonomy is being preserved. In other words, preserving the autonomy of
nations reinforces the strength and legitimacy of the international institution in
question. Hence, I do not consider the goals of preserving nations' autonomy
and designing a legitimate international institution to be opposed, but rather
reconcilable, mutually reinforcing ones. Now, I turn to the second criterion of
design: the lifting of the bifurcation between the populations of nations.
2. Lifting the Bifurcation
"Bifurcation," in this context, is the notion that nations' populations are sep-
arated from one another, and do not communicate with one another. I describe
two varieties of bifurcation below: the state-based, executive bifurcation variant,
and the democratic bifurcation variant.
86. Id. Bunge uses the word "culturology" rather than "culture," which is the title of chapter
five of his book. In the text he uses the terms "culturology" and "culture" interchangeably.
87. FATHALI MOGHADDAM ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 4, 5
(1993).
HASSAN EL MENYAWI
Separating nations' populations from one another is a by-product of adopting
an international system based on state-centrism. The effect is that states, and typ-
ically their executive branches, at most can inter-mediate citizens' voices when de-
termining international law. I see the task of lifting the bifurcation between
nations' populations as central to the task of designing democratic international
institutions. Without the possibility of effective international communication, it is
difficult for states to mutually control negative interdependencies, while retaining
positive ones. The only way their desires would be made clear is for national pop-
ulations to communicate and strategize with one another.
One might ask, "Why cannot the state communicate with other states to
deal with such interdependencies?" While this is a valid question, states (partic-
ularly democratic states) are designed to respond to the needs of their citizens.
And so the voices and decisions of citizens are mediated by local events. Consid-
ering that there are no democratic inputs from the populations of other nations,
states do not know how their decisions might affect other nations, or how other
nations might affect them.
88
The most appropriate way to deal with this barrier to communication is to
somehow lift the bifurcation. It is for this reason that I consider lifting the bifur-
cation a crucial criterion for institution design. And in Part III, I provide some
design proposals that might lift the bifurcation, thereby allowing the popula-
tions of nations to communicate with one another.
88. It is beyond the scope of this article to show that the bifurcation causes nations to ignore the
needs and concerns of other nations in the world, also reducing its rate of compliance with and en-
forcement of international law. See generally Andrew L. Strauss, Overcoming the Dysfunction of the
Bifurcated Global System: The Promise of a Peoples Assembly, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
489, 489-505 (1999).
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a. Bifurcation Created Through State (Executive) Intermediation
The state-centric international system 89 "as presently structured relies on
states,"90 and more particularly, although not exclusively,9' the executive
branches of states "to be intermediaries between"92 citizens of different nations.
This implies that the people of the world are "not directly involved in creating
international law, and the international legal order."'93 Instead, the populations
of nations are in a so-called "bifurcated" international system, which disassoci-
ates citizens of different nations from one another through the interposition of
state or executive actors. 9' And so citizens who wish to influence or participate
in the creation of international law can only do so by petitioning their own gov-
ernment, which might or might not "respond favorably to their appeal. ' ,95 "This
bifurcated system, requiring states to intermediate between citizens and the in-
ternational order,"96 is problematic because "[iut charges states with setting the
rules [of] the international system ""7-states are the actors that determine the
89. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 477-82 (explaining that the current in-
ternational system is state- and executive-centric, and is far away from being described a "people-
centred" system based on democracy);seealso HELD,SUpra note 17, at ch. 12 (arguing that the inter-
national system remains a "state-centred ... model," which "lie[s] at some considerable distance
from what might be called a 'thicker' democratic ordering of global affairs.").
90. Strauss, supra note 88, at 492.
91. As a generalization, the executive seems to play a significant role in international affairs
when one empirically examines the way the nations of the world interact. Depending on the na-
tion, different components of the state may likewise play a very significant role at the international
level. Consider the U.S. Senate, a part of the United States' legislative branch, which plays an in-
creasingly significant role in international matters.
92. Strauss, supra note 88, at 492.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 492-97.
95. Id. at 492.
96. Id. at 493.
97. Id. "The dominant view is that under the bifurcated international legal system, interna-
tional law emanates from the general consent of states." Id. at 493 n. 11. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, In-
ternational Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES COURs 46 (1989) (proclaiming that
"[ilnter-state law is made, or recognized, or accepted, by the 'will' of states. Nothing becomes law
for the international system from any other source."). Although generally seen as the way that in-
ternational law is created, there have been alternative suggestions about how to create interna-
tional law. See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, LAW IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL VILLAGE: A POST-WESTPHALIAN
PERSPECTIVE (1998) (arguing that an increasing interest in the law of humanity and the erosion of
territoriality has helped create international laws); FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7,
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law.98 Bruce Ackerman disparagingly refers to such a bifurcation as an "ambas-
sadorial"99 model "in which the peoples' voices [are] ... filtered through their
national governments"' ° (executives) and states. This conception reflects the
fact that "[s]tates, or more precisely those who control state power,"'0 l decide
which international laws they wish to agree to regardless of what the consensus
of the population of their nation is, and even more so, regardless of the global
consensus.0 2 Hence, this also means that nation-states do not have to consider
at 477-82 (discussing fairness as an interest that prompts the creation of international law). See also
James Crawford, Democracy and International Law, 64 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 113, 117 (1993) (arguing
that under a state-centric system, the executive branch has comprehensive power to make trea-
ties). Also many international scholars see international law as highly statist, which means that it
vests all decision making for the creation and development of international law in the state. This
version of the doctrine of state sovereignty is a complicated one and arguably originated with the
Peace of Westphalia of 1648. See Louis W. Goodman, Democracy, Sovereignty, and Intervention, 9
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27 (1993); Mary Ellen Turpel & Philippe Sands, Peremptory International
Law and Sovereignty: Some Questions, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 364, 365 (1988); John Kuhn Bleimaier,
The Future of Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 6 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 17 (1993); M. Kelly Malone,
The Rights of Newly Emerging Democratic States Prior to International Recognition and the Serbo-
Croatian Conflict, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 81 (1992). John Austin's ideas about international
law, especially how international law comes into being are relevant when attempting to under-
stand this bifurcation. For Austin, laws are "laws" if they are made by a "sovereign." He argues
that every law flows from a determinate source. For Austin, the source of law is the state. Austin
embraces this bifurcation between nations, in turn adopting what I refer to as a "state-centric" in-
ternational system. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (Robert Campbell ed.,
1875); JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995)
(1832); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 351-54 (1945) (giving a similar descrip-
tion of a state-centric international system).
98. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 11-13 (explaining why the international
community of states as a "rule community" has created its own process for making and applying
rules and resolving disputes about their meaning); see also id. at 477-82 (discussing the interna-
tional system's basis on the interrelations of states, particularly the executive branch).
99. Atik,supra note 2, at 471 (citing Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 633, 680 (2000)).
100. Atik,supra note 2, at 471.
101. Strauss, supra note 88, at 493.
102. See id.
Generally speaking, states have accepted the view that they are only bound by those
international laws to which they agree, either explicitly by treaty or impliedly by
customary practice. This statement, however, draws upon a long tradition of discus-
sion and debate and is subject to some qualification. First, in regard to customary
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the implications of their decisions and actions-the interdependencies-
between their nation and another, because nations only respond and create laws
explicitly for their own citizens.
international law, states have traditionally maintained that they are only bound by
customary laws that they accept. The generally accepted requirement, however, for
manifesting a lack of consent ("the persistent objector rule") demands that states de-
clare their intention not to be bound by a customary law at the time of the formation
of the law.
Id. at 493 (citing Luigi Condorelli, Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS
179,205 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991)).
For a variety of reasons, this is sufficiently unlikely to happen that, practically
speaking, most of the time states are considered bound by customary international
law. Second, and more fundamentally, there has been an increasing, though seldom
articulated, trend toward viewing customary international law as binding on even
those states that have stated a desire not to be bound based upon a subtle shift to the
notion that a general consensus among states binds all states.
Id. at 493-94 n.13 (citing J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J.
INT'L L. 449 (2000) (discussing customary international law and arguing that customary interna-
tional law is not a legitimate source of international law)). Strauss disagrees, arguing that "most
states, however, do not seem to accept this view." Id. at 494 n.13. Strauss also states that:
Treaties are to an ever-greater extent replacing customary international law as the
primary source of legal obligations on states. Whether a state wishes to adhere to a
treaty is, under the state created rules of the international system, always voluntary.
Here, however, some qualification is also in order. While a state always has the legal
option to resist a treaty, as a practical matter, in certain cases diplomatic pressure
may be such that a state actually has little option but to accept a treaty.
Id. (citing Robert Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT'L ORG. 1 (1986) (discussing
the question of international norms and the role of reciprocity in creating international coopera-
tion)). Strauss continues, stating:
The final qualification to the absolute ability of states to opt out of international law
is that most states seem to accept that in certain very limited cases fundamental in-
ternational norms can apply to states that do not in any way consent to be bound by
them. They hold that, regardless of consent, states can be bound by natural law
(some concept of absolute right) not to engage in certain basic wrongs.
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334
(1969) (providing that a treaty is "void if... it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general inter-
national law"). Peremptory norms are probably inclusive of core human rights standards. Id. at
494 n.13 (citing LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (Jus COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS, Part Il (1988)).
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b. The Democratic Bifurcation Variant
Suggested democratic models, which are not executive or state-centric such
as the representational ones presented by Held," 3 Reisman, and Franck, and dis-
cussed above, contain (although admittedly to a lesser degree than the executive-
and state-dominated variant of bifurcation) a second type of bifurcation. Al-
though democratic options are indeed an improvement over the state bifurca-
tion variant, there is a similarity between the two: Suggested democratic models,
in the same way as the state-centric (executive) model of international law, ex-
pect the population of a nation to have a representative who intermediates the
concerns of her population's citizenry. In effect, just as in the case of the state-
centric bifurcation variant, the population of one nation is not directly commu-
nicating with the populations of other nations. Such intermediation would not
constitute, in my view, a democracy linking the populations of nations. The type
of democracy linking the populations of nations requires that the populations of
nations communicate and deliberate with one another directly, and not through
the inter-mediation of representatives, even if they are democratically elected.
Such democratic models would enhance the bifurcation that already exists
between the populations of nations, and is problematic, because the population
of one nation is not necessarily expected to know anything about the concerns,
values, and problems, and aspirations of the populations of other nations. In
other words, this democratic, representational type of bifurcation exists as a re-
sult of the sharp separation between the populations of nations. In effect, the
"voice" of each nation's population is not heard by the others.
c. Lifting the Bifurcation
One of the goals of this article is to find a way to lift the bifurcation between
nations' populations. The institution design proposals that I describe in Part III
below are supposed to be one (of likely many) ways to lift the bifurcation. This
bifurcation occurs when there is no communication between the populations of
nations to collectively consider and control two or more nations' interdepen-
dencies. The design goal is to create a democracy in which the populations of
103. See, e.g., David Held, Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order, in PROSPECTS FOR
DEMocRcACY: NORTH, SOUTH, EAST, WEST 40-41 (David Held ed., 1993).
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nations communicate directly with one another. Even if they elect representa-
tives to represent them, lifting the bifurcation implies that somehow the process
will allow populations of nations to discuss their issues and mutual concerns.
This is why Held's democratic proposal does not lift the bifurcation, because,
again, representatives are selected directly by a particular nation, without neces-
sarily being required to hear the concerns and issues of other nations. Instead,
the representative goes to an assembly and just "represents" his population, a
population that has made demands on its representatives without direct knowl-
edge of the concerns of the populations of other nations. In other words, the
people expect their representatives to do certain things, act in certain ways, and
take certain issue positions, without necessarily knowing how other national
populations feel. Perhaps if the populations of nations were to deliberate to-
gether, they would take different positions, or learn from one another, thereby
achieving some compromise.
B. Browsing the Shopping List of Democracies In Search of Democratic Inspiration
In this section, I will browse briefly through some democratic models that
might be used as an inspiration when thinking about institutional design of an
international democratic structure. At the end, I select a model of democracy
which I consider to be appropriate in thinking, in guiding, and in reflecting on
some preliminary proposals for the design of democratic international institu-
tions. This part of the article consists of a brief discussion about different types of
democracy in the literature, one that might be useful to think about democratic
international institution design. In effect, I completed this part thinking of the
international legal system as the prince in search of Cinderella by making every
woman in the kingdom try on the shoe she left behind at the palace. In effect, the
international system is in search of "democratic shoes" that fit. These democratic
shoes would fit when they lift the bifurcation between populations of nations,
while also protecting the cultural and political autonomy of nations, both large
and small.
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1. The Mega World State
Most scholars have discounted the idea of a world state, including scholars as
far back as Kant.' ° However, it deserves some mention. Although it would lift the
current bifurcation-since all nations are represented in a single assembly-a
world state would limit the autonomy of nations, particularly smaller nations,
whose voices are likely to be diluted by more powerful, more populous nations.
Such democratic structures represent what Weiler would see as a strong example
of adopting a "statal orientation" when conceptualizing international democracy.
However, a world or mega-state is not seen as unrealistic only for these rea-
sons. Also referred to as global "republicanism,"1 5 this democratic approach is
meant to create a common, shared identity between the populations of nations as
a prerequisite to international governance. 6 Indeed, many republican theories
are based on the idea that some common identity must be forged °7 to hold the
world community together, typically held together through bonds of language,
ethnicity, or religion-or some other shared characteristic.' Many see this as
highly problematic considering that international democracy is supposed to con-
struct a system that allows for populations of different backgrounds and identi-
ties to participate, rather than the making of a single world nation with a single
population." Furthermore, nations are unlikely to agree to participate in a
structure that is likely to jeopardize their cultural autonomy.
2. The "One State, One Vote" Rule of the U.N. General Assembly
A second model, the "one state, one vote" rule is, in my view, not a demo-
cratic model at all, considering that nations vote, for example, in the General As-
sembly, on particular resolutions, but the governments could themselves be
autocratic rather than democratic.
104. IMMANUEL KANT, PRINCIPLES OF LAWFUL POLITICS: PHILOSOPHICAL DRAFT TOWARD ETERNAL
PEACE 80 (Wolfgang Schwarz trans., 1988) (1795).
105. See Robert Howse, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and the Problem of Democracy, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 469, 472-
74 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).
106. See id. at 473.
107. See id. at 473-74.
108. See id. at 473.
109. See id. at 473-74.
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This approach does not lift the bifurcation between nations because the ap-
pointees are chosen by the executive. Again, through the appointee-representatives
at the U.N. General Assembly, states intermediate the concerns and needs of citi-
zens, if at all, without the populations of nations consulting and communicating di-
rectly with one another.
Also, the "one state, one vote" rule can be problematic because individuals in
small states have a greater influence on decision making than individuals in
larger ones, creating the possibility that decisions could be made by collaborating
states representing only a tiny fraction of the world's population.
3. Representative Democracy
The representative democratic model does not require that all nations be rep-
resented in a single assembly, but is more modest. It suggests that international
democracy is best furthered when nation-states themselves are democratic-
meaning that they are based on the consent of the governed, as expressed through
regular, free elections and universal suffrage, and then, the executive, through an
act of representation, interacts with other nations and determines international
law. This idea, inherited from liberal democratic theory, is that nationally demo-
cratically elected executives around the world intermediate the concerns and
needs of the nation's citizens when interacting with other nations on the interna-
tional stage.
For Slaughter and other advocates, representative democracy is a legitimate
form of international governance since it is "in the hands of national
citizens ... [to] hold ... governments ... accountable for their [interInational ac-
tivities." Although this might be true, representative democracy is based on the
state's executive branch, and involves the population of nations only indirectly. It
does not provide for communication channels directly linking the world's na-
tional populations. And so, the approach does not fully lift the bifurcation.
4. Suggested Models of Democratic International Institutions
There are several international democratic institutions suggested in the lit-
erature. Consider Held, Franck, Falk, Strauss, Reisman, Innis Claude, and
110. Slaughter, supra note 4, at 186.
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Hilary French. At the risk of seeming simplistic, one can generalize about these
institutional suggestions by arguing that they all recommend instituting assem-
blies with a democratically-elected representative from every nation in the
world, elected by the population of each nation. I will briefly comment on such
approaches, and make the argument that, although I consider these approaches
admirable as a starting point from which to reflect about democracy at the inter-
national level, and although they are more desirable than other models of de-
mocracy, they still do not go far enough in lifting the bifurcation between the
populations of nations, and still put at risk the cultural and political autonomy of
nations, particularly smaller ones.
Just as making the European Union more democratic is often viewed as re-
quiring a strong European Parliament, making international law more demo-
cratic could entail establishing popularly elected international bodies with either
general or limited decision-making powers. Proposals along these lines include
those by Held to create an independent assembly of democratic peoples,"' by
French to establish a body composed of representatives of national parliaments,
perhaps as a transition to a popular assembly," 2 and most recently by Falk and
Strauss, who proposed a popularly representative Global Assembly, with repre-
sentatives elected by the populations of each nation, and a simultaneous right for
global civil society to lobby the assembly.'' 3 In contrast to the "one state, one
vote" rule, these options represent a "one nation, one democratic representative,
one vote" rule in the context of an international assembly. These democratic op-
tions, however, do not go far enough in lifting the bifurcation between the pop-
ulations of nations, since each nation selects representatives, but the populations
of nations do not communicate directly with each other. Also, these institutions
are so large that they risk alienating small and larger nations alike, as well as po-
tentially jeopardizing their cultural and political autonomy. Some believe that
111. See Held,supra note 103, at 41.
112. Hilary F. French, Strengthening International Environmental Governance, 3 J. ENV'T & DEV.
50, 65 (1994).
113. See Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation ofa Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy
and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 193 (2000); see also Richard Falk &
Andrew Strauss, Globalization Needs a Dose of Democracy, IN T'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 5, 1999, at 8
(advocating a new global peoples' assembly to respond to international crises); Andrew Strauss &
Richard Falk, For a Global Peoples' Assembly, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 14, 1997, at 8 (promoting
the idea of a popularly elected world governing body); Andrew Strauss & Richard Falk, All That
Dough, PHIL. INQ., Oct. 12, 1997, at 7.
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these suggested democratic institutions potentially strengthen the voices of pow-
erful and populous nations, while weakening those of others. Others argue that
such a structure might overpower larger nations through the grouping of
smaller nations. Either way, whichever argument one assumes to be true, or
even, if both are accurate at different times, such institutions are inappropriate if
it is our goal to preserve the political and cultural autonomy of nations.
There are less ambitious institutional models, such as that of Michael Reis-
man who suggests reforming the United Nations General Assembly by "parlia-
mentarizing" it." 4 Reisman quotes Franck," 5 who has proposed adopting direct
popular elections, which entail sending nationally elected representatives to the
General Assembly, in a similar process to that of the European Parliament. How-
ever, Franck admits that the fact that state-centrism has been a central aspect of
the United Nations General Assembly (U.N.G.A.) structure would pose serious
challenges toward achieving such reform, even if bold and worthwhile.'16
Instead, therefore, Franck develops what he calls a "modest proposal,""' 7 in
which he recommends that the U.N.G.A. be transformed into a two-chamber
body.118 One of the chambers would contain representatives appointed by states
114. See Michael Reisman,supra note 51 at 19.
115. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,supra note 7, at 483; see also Thomas Franck, Speech at
the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Council on International Law, October 21, 1994.
116. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, SUpra note 7, at 483.
117. See id.
118. See, e.g., Proceedings of the First International Conference on a More Democratic U.N., in
BUILDING A MORE DEMOCRATIC UNITED NATIONS (Frank Barnaby ed., 1991) (describing a recent
initiative with respect to the design of a Second U.N. General Assembly, sponsored by the Inter-
national Network for a U.N. Second Assembly (INFU.S.A), often referred to as the "We the
Peoples" initiative). Their proposals mirror those of Thomas Franck. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 483-84. Robert Sheppard describes the institutional arrangements
that have been recommended in the initiative:
[The initiative] mirrors many of the reforms proposed by Thomas Franck. It pro-
posed that a democratic 'People's Chamber' be created by the General Assembly
without need for redrafting the United Nations Charter by utilizing Article 22 of
the Charter, which provides: 'The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.' The advantage of
such a process would be that no new Convention to redraft the Charter would be
needed nor subject to boycott by dissenting big powers unwilling to see dilution of
their existing privileges. INFU.S.A has presented its proposal to the General As-
sembly continuously since 1985, and a series of Non-Governmental Organization
(NGO) conferences to promote the plan has been pursued under the Conference on
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(typically an executive branch appointment) similar to the way that the Assembly
is constituted at present, retaining the one state, one vote principle, while the
other chamber would be directly elected in accordance with universal suffrage
and democratic principles. One chamber would thus give a voice to govern-
ments and the other to people. "Resolutions on important matters," which have
thus far required a two-thirds majority as a result of United Nations Charter
Art. 18(2)1" might instead "require a simple majority of both chambers.' 120
Franck's approach contains both types of bifurcation: when referring to the
executive-based chamber, it is clear that the executive-type bifurcation is not
lifted, and the democratically elected chamber does not lift the democratic-type
bifurcation. Although the second chamber does not lift the bifurcation, it is an
imaginative idea, which actually adds some democracy to the international sys-
tem. But, unfortunately, the voice of the first chamber would likely dilute that of
the second, since the first would likely play a more significant or influential role
in the overall structure, because of the historical preference for executive ap-
pointments at the U.N.G.A.. Or even if the second chamber did operate, the in-
fluence of democracy is minimal, considering the mutual presence of an
appointed chamber.
But, even if one assumed that there were a United Nations second chamber,
with a representative elected from each nation, the model is still inappropriate,
considering that it is susceptible to inducing polarization. Consider the "North-
South" divide reflected in the U.N.G.A. between the very populous yet econom-
ically disadvantaged developing countries of the South, constituting a demo-
a More Democratic United Nations (CAMDU.N.). Partially in response to such ef-
forts, the House of Commons of Canada offered to host a first exploratory meeting
towards the establishment of a United Nations parliamentary assembly in 1995.
The basic principle of the INFU.S.A proposals is that there should be a U.N. Sec-
ond Assembly of directly elected non-governmental representatives representing all
global inhabitants on a universal and equal basis as a complement to the existing
U.N. institutions based on representatives of nation-states only. This would add to
the democratic legitimacy of the work product of the U.N. and emphasize the col-
lective responsibility and accountability of all governments to the collective peoples
of the world. This would also facilitate dialogue between governmental and non-
governmental representatives but would not seek to supplant the nation-states or
the essential elements of present state sovereignty.
Sheppard, supra note 24, at 8-9.
119. U.N. CHARTER art. 18, para. 2 .
120. FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 484.
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cratic majority of the world's population, and the economically advanced
leading powers of the North, dominating the Security Council. In this case, such
structures might overpower, through the grouping of smaller nations, the larger
nations. But, it is equally possible that such a structure would potentially
strengthen the voices of more powerful, populous nations, while weakening
others. This proposal thus falls victim to the same weaknesses of the ideas of
Held, French, Falk, and Strauss.
5. The Public Deliberation Model of Democracy: Inspiration Toward
Democratic Institution Design
There are theories that do not presume that a shared identity is a prerequi-
site to developing democracy (or democratic relations). A more prominent one
that has become both popular, strongly influencing recent scholarship, and enor-
mously promising, is the public deliberation model of democracy, found in the
works of Habermas,12' Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson.'22 This model
stands for the idea that shared understanding between national populations is
possible, and correspondingly, that creating a shared identity based on ethnicity
(or some other shared characteristic) for instance is not a prerequisite to attain-
ing shared understanding. It instead emphasizes rationality and communica-
tion, which, as international relations constructivists argue, is the basis for
explaining why shared understandings occur between the populations of
121. See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 287-328 (William Rehg trans., 1996) [hereinafter BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS]; JURGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
(Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1995); Thomas Risse, Let's Argue!: Com-
municative Action in World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 1 (2000) (referencing Habermas' theory of com-
municative action in distinguishing bargaining, rhetorical action, and truth-seeking
argumentation); Nicholas Onuf, Do Rules Say What They Do? From Ordinary Language to Interna-
tional Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 385, 397-402 (1985) (considering Habermas in the constructivist lit-
erature); FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 124, 230
(1989); Harald Mll1er, Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln: Zur Kritik der util-
itaristischen Handlungstheorien, I ZEITSCHRIFT FUR INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN 15 (1994) (giv-
ing a critique of utilitarian approaches to regime theory that relies heavily on Habermas).
122. See, e.g., AMy GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996) (ex-
pounding on the idea that when citizens disagree morally, they should work together to reach
mutually acceptable solutions).
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nations (whether between states or citizens). Instead of emphasizing identity
based on some shared characteristic such as ethnicity, they consider an identity
based on respectful, mutual deliberation. 123 It assumes that identities change as a
result of "learning,"'124 which is achieved as a result of deliberation, or communi-
cation with others-and hence, it is referred to as "public deliberation.' 25 It is
essentially premised on the idea that through communication with others, na-
tional populations can mutually sustain their autonomy and control interdepen-
dencies, by making "real choices" that they would otherwise be unable to make
if they had not communicated, deliberated, negotiated with each other. 126
Habermas' public deliberation democratic paradigm,127 or "communicative
action," 128 is, according to him, both influenced by and genealogically traceable to
Locke's ideas of "consent of the governed,"'129 as well as related ideas, such as "reg-
ular and free elections and "universal suffrage." As fellow public deliberation the-
orist Jean Cohen also points out, the idea includes "voting, parties, [and]
elections," but also supplements something to democracy: the ability for citizens
to communicate directly with one another-to "facilitate ... favorable conditions
for expression, association, and participation.'. 3 ° Habermas concedes that public
deliberation includes elections, 31 but much more. As he famously put it, the goal
of the public deliberation model of democracy is to establish "[t]he conditions of
123. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 121, at 287-328.
124. See HowsE, supra note 105, at 478-79.
125. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,supra note 121.
126. See HowsE, supra note 105, at 469,478.
127. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,supra note 121.
128. See id.
129. See Jiurgen Habermas, Three Models of Normativity, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CON-
TESTINO BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 21, 28 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) [hereinafter Three Models
ofNormativity]; see also Jean Cohen, Further Reflections on the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND THE
PUBLIC SPHERE 446 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992). See generally JORGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND
APPLICATION (1993); Juirgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the
Future of Europe, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 255-82 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995); BETWEEN FACTS
AND NORMS,supra note 121, at 287-328; Juirgen Habermas, The European Nation State, Its Achieve-
ment and Its Limitations: On Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, 9 RATIO JURIS 125-37
(1996).
130. Jean Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 186-87 (J. Elster ed.,
1998).
131. Three Models of Normativity, supra note 129, at 28-29.
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communication under which there can come into being a discursive formation of
will and opinion on the part of the public composed of the citizens." '
Habermas' idea of democracy supplements Locke's notion of democracy
with the elements of communication, and discursive will formation. In fact,
Habermas sees these supplemented elements as being inspired by but not iden-
tical to the republican theses, such as that of Rousseau (discussed above).' 33 Hab-
ermas does not accept the extreme version of the republican thesis; he argues that
it goes too far in its requirements of solidarity and common identification.'34
Rather, he argues for a middle-ground approach-one that seeks mutual under-
standing, communication, and consensus between the populations of nations.
In other words, the Lockean element of consent of the governed and (the
Lockean-inspired element of) voting are supplemented or re-arranged with other
institutional elements, when designing an international democratic institution, to
ensure that communication occurs between the populations of nations. An insti-
tution that stimulates the "formation of will and opinion" of the populations of na-
tions is, therefore, the goal of public deliberation.
Habermas' approach has influenced Gutmann and Thompson, who pro-
vide a more detailed elaboration of the notion of public deliberation. Public de-
liberation for Gutmann and Thompson may lead national populations "to take
seriously the claims of other"'35 national populations, in turn enhancing "equal-
ity, " 36 and in the case of nation-states, enhancing nation-states' mutual auton-
omy. Gutmann and Thompson state that "[d]eliberation permits clarification of
what is really at stake in disagreements between [nations' populations], allow-
ing, for instance, identification of those conflicts that result from misunder-
standing and misinformation, and that could in fact be solved without need for
trade-offs between divergent fundamental values."' 37 And, "deliberation also
holds out the prospect of learning from others."'38 In fact, it assumes that
national populations come to "'learn' from one another,"'139 as they "come to
132. Id. at 28. See also Cohen, supra note 129, at 446.
133. Three Models of Normativity,supra note 129, at 21,28-29.
134. Id. at 21.
135. Howse, supra note 105, at 479.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. GUTMANN AND THOMPSON, Supra note 122, at 43.
139. Howse, supra note 105, at 479.
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recognize" 140 ways to reconcile their needs, "and develop new views and policies
that are more widely justifiable.'' 4 Indeed, such a description has been recently
empirically validated by international relations constructivists, who show how
interaction between the populations of nations, as well as politicians of nations,
can potentially result in mutual learning between persons or populations, as well
as change in the identities of these same agents. 142
Public deliberation democracy has the potential to guide the design of demo-
cratic institutions that ensure and protect the cultural and political autonomy of
nations. It also has the potential of lifting the bifurcation-in turn allowing na-
tions' populations collectively to control interdependencies-since it assumes that
communication between the populations of nations is at the center of democracy.
Public deliberation does not assume that democracy ought to be modeled in the
image of the state-it does not assume that each nation is represented by a single
person in a single global assembly. Instead, public deliberation defines democracy
in a way that reorients how "representation" occurs. If communication is the cen-
tral goal of democracy, then representation should be determined in ways that
promote communication between the populations of nations. Having found what
seems to be appropriate democratic shoes for international institutional design, in
the next part, I use these insights as guidance, or more fundamentally, as a point
of inspiration from which to forward design proposals.
But before starting to make institution design proposals, it is important to
mention why Habermas' theory is theoretically amenable to the international
level. His approach, unlike Rawls', does not assume that the population of a
nation is supposed to refrain from holding deep convictions rooted in religion,
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See generally Jutta Brunn&e & Stephen J. Toope, The Changing Nile Basin Regime: Does Law
Matter?, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 105 (2002). Although these identities did not exist before, they are
now part of the culture of the nation in question. Some might argue that changing identities does
not preserve cultural autonomy, but this is inaccurate since cultures change through their inter-
actions. My definition of autonomy presupposes that changes do occur, and these changes might
arise from interactions with other cultures. See Part III infra. The point of my definition is that it
is better if such changes occur as a function of the choices of a nation's population.
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conscience, or philosophy.'43 For Habermas, nations' populations should com-
municate with one another, without being expected to rid their identities of con-
tent, and without necessarily becoming a community of nations, as members of
a mega-state. 44 Basing an international institution on public deliberation is,
therefore, less likely to be accused of being a veil for the imposition of a particu-
lar set of values on the populations of the world's nations.
143. See Jutta Brunn& & Stephen Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements ofan In-
teractional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19, 63 n.192 (2000), Brunn6
and Toope give the following comments on Rawlsian theory:
The specificity of culture is almost wholly eviscerated in Rawlsian theory.., and
posits that all that is required for successful liberal politics is an 'overlapping consen-
sus.' While this new approach would seem at first to represent a deep pluralism, the
consensus Rawls describes can only be achieved if, for the purposes of public argu-
ment, subjects refrain from invoking any deeply held convictions rooted in religion
or philosophy. They must simply accept 'the fact of reasonable pluralism.' [And]
Rawls extends this analysis to the international realm (on the concept of 'toleration'
of non-liberal peoples).
Id. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 59-78 (1999) [hereinafter THE LAW OF PEOPLES]; see also
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM 48
(1999) (giving a mirror image version of the "community of communities"). "Not only is Rawls'
notion of the 'overlapping consensus' unrealistic if people hold their beliefs to be 'true,' it fails to
explain why all comprehensive views are excluded from public discourse, except the one that
treats 'justice' as the only appropriate value for social organization." Brunn&e & Toope, supra. See
also MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 184-218 (2d ed. 1998). "[Even]
Rawls admits that his vision of'justice' as the overriding social virtue can leave 'gaps' for the [pop-
ulations of different nations]." Brunn& & Toope, supra. See RAWLS,supra at 126. "For Aristotle,
unlike Rawls, justice is only one of the virtues, and it is generally inferior to friendship." Brunn&
& Toope, supra. See ARISTOTLE, [THE NICHOMACHEAN] ETHICS V:I, at 171, and VIII: , at 258 (J.A.K.
Thompson & Hugh Tredennick trans., rev. ed. 1976).
144. Another opinion on the idea of nations of the world forming a "community" is that of
Thomas Franck, who tried to avoid the problem of identifying an "international community" by
describing the international community as "secular," rather than "moral" community. The secu-
lar community is assumed to share certain values such as promotion of trade, protection of the en-
vironment, economic development, communications and peace. But, one can argue that these
values are themselves rooted in moral (or at least ethical) assumptions associated with specific cul-
tural attributes, so Franck's attempt to evade this problem seems to have failed. See FRANCK, supra
note 32, at 51, 181. Later, Franck changed his argument, informing us that procedural fairness (le-
gitimacy) did not depend upon any notion of community, but that substantive fairness
(distributive justice) was "rooted in the moral values of the community in which the legal system
operates." FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 8, 26. Franck's idea of "community"
is relatively thin and arguably appropriate as a basis for the design of a democratic international
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III. DESIGN PROPOSALS TOWARD GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
The goal of this part is to describe some design proposals that have the po-
tential to lift the bifurcation, while maintaining the autonomy of nation-states.
The idea is to provide some specific design proposals for the international level
in order to stimulate a discussion on the topic of international institution design.
Habermas' public deliberation model inspires these design proposals.
(discussed in Part II). Habermas' description of democracy as communication
linking the populations of nations,'45 which eventually results in shared under-
standings, without such populations necessarily being part of a shared community
based on "thick" values, provided me with a promising starting point from which
to think about international democracy, as well as a point of inspiration to guide
my thoughts as I went from institutional mirage to institutional proposal, hope-
fully toward institutional completion in a subsequent article.
Although it is difficult precisely to enumerate all the benefits that accrue
from a paradigm such as Habermas', I believe there are two central reasons why
it is useful as a guide for institution building.'46 For one, it bases democracy on
communication, and not on any specific design or institutional requirements in
the same way that representative democracy, for example, does, thereby enhanc-
ing the creative possibilities and flexibility for designing institutions.'47 Second,
it does not have an explicitly statal orientation,"' as Weiler would put it, and
therefore, it does not make any assumption about nations having to participate
in a single State structure, and thereby potentially harm the autonomy of smaller
nations.
institution. Franck's conception of community is largely contractarian, even though he includes
"shared values." This parallels John Rawls' ideas of deontological liberalism. See JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 143, at 32, 113 (discussing the over-
lapping consensus, and the growth of mutually caring societies). One could speculate that as a re-
sult of the thinness of Rawls' and Franck's conceptions of community, Franck was able to claim a
burgeoning global "moral" or "rule" community. See FRANCK, supra note 32, at 11-12. Nonethe-
less, Franck's approach is inappropriate as a foundation for contemplating international institu-
tions. Since it is based on Rawls' ideas of the international level, it is based on "state consent", and
reflects the executive (state) bifurcation variant. See part III infra.
145. See Three Models of Normativity, supra note 129.
146. 1 use the words "institution building" and "institution design" interchangeably.
147. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 121, 287-328.
148. WEILER, supra note 8, at 279.
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I propose designs to lift the bifurcation by creating a system based on direct
communication between national populations. I should make clear that my goal
is rather modest; it is not to lay out a detailed description of an alternative institu-
tion, exhaustively listing each design proposal required for its overall completion.
Held cautions against taking such a path when embarking on democratic institu-
tion design, reminding us that "institutional solution[s] to the problems of democ-
racy in the global order" are very difficult to envision.149 Keeping this in mind, the
goal is to show that it is possible to imagine new directions, by providing some de-
sign proposals-in other words, elements of an overall institution. To put it
simply, the goal is not to arrive at institutional completion, but rather to provide
some proposals as a prelude to further research on international institution design.
Some might see the project of designing international institutions as politi-
cally ambitious. Held, commenting on the relation between feasibility and am-
bition, says that "political feasibility""15 should not limit political ambition, "[for]
what is ambitious today might prove feasible tomorrow.''51 In light of this, Held
also cautions us that when embarking on institution design projects, one should
distinguish between changes that serve as short-term objectives, "such as reform
of the U.N. Security Council, and changes that can serve as long-term objectives,
such as the creation of global popular assembly" '52 Indeed, I see my project as
long-term; first, stimulating discussion, followed by further research, and
maybe later, institutional changes, after arriving at a complete, and appropriate
institutional design.
The goal of my design project is to reach an optimal mix between utopia and
reality." 3 But if this is so, why not remove this part, where I provide actual pro-
posals, and instead simply end with a research agenda? I thought a great deal
about this question, and, with all humility, I believe that the best way to persuade
someone to participate in a design project is to provide some proposals that re-
veal that it might be possible and worthwhile to design such an institution. By
making some proposals, I hope at the very least to show that it is possible to
imagine international democratic institutions that meet some of the design prin-
ciples described above.
149. HELD, SUpra note 63.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2 8 5 .
152. Id. at 279-80.
153. See EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS: 1919-1939, at 94 (2nd ed. 1945).
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When contemplating institution design, my thoughts persistently led to the
same question: Who are the actors involved? Or, who are the "governed" and
those who "govern," to put it in the parlance of democratic theorists. Related
questions, such as "Who are the voters?", "Who are the representatives?", and
"Who elects whom?" are the central questions on which a democratic institution
is built. After all, as Anthony Giddens, a sociologist who studies institutional
structures, shows, an institution is based and determined by its agents and their
"relational interactions." '154 He furthermore argues that the identities and roles
of those agents define and make up the institution.'55 Hence, I describe who the
actors are and what roles these actors play, and how they relate.
As a note of caution, it can be argued that the way in which the following
sub-sections are divided is artificial, considering that all the principles and ex-
planatory points inter-relate, mutually and reciprocally influencing and rein-
forcing one another; without one, another principle does not make sense. In
other words, the principles mutually presuppose one another, and are meant to
mutually achieve an overall picture. Of course, other scholars might order these
thoughts differently, and I welcome such a debate.
A. Elected Representatives Representing Two Nations Simultaneously: Changing the
"One Representative, One Nation" Rule to "One Representative, Two Nations"
To develop or design an international democratic institution is challenging,
and requires complex approaches. Finding ways to design institutions that en-
gender shared understandings, and that allow representatives to hear each
other's concerns without creating polarization between nations requires a struc-
ture that is premised on a more distinctive principle of equality than the one
manifested in the "one state, one vote" doctrine of the U.N.G.A., or the "one
state, one democratic representative, one vote" in a democratically established
assembly, such as the one suggested by Held. Considering that each nation
wishes to conserve its cultural autonomy, polarization between nations is
154. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 2-3, 16-19, 22-28, 36, 83-87, 132-39,
162-65, 179-80, 281-84 (1984) (providing a helpful review of basic concepts) [hereinafter CONSTI-
TUTION]. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, A CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM: THE
NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE (198 1) (applying structuration theory in an analysis of the emergence
and continuing force of the nation-state).
155. CONSTITUTION, supra note 154.
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expected to become a common phenomenon-making it difficult for nations to
come to agreement about important issues. However, such polarization might
not result if we adopt a different principle of equality-not the version of equal-
ity that implies that a single person represents a specific nation, whether ap-
pointed by the executive, or elected by the people to represent them in an
assembly, the version based on domestic sphere democracy."5 6 Citizens of na-
tional democracies typically vote for a single candidate based in a specific geo-
graphic area. For example, only Arizonans vote for U.S. Senator John McCain.
Transposing this approach to the international level, wherein each nation sends
a single representative to serve in an assembly, is based on what Barkun would
call a "false analogy" between national and international levels.'57
Even scholars such as Franck have used national analogies to conceptualize
international democratic structures and processes-and this is not an uncom-
mon feature of the literature. Consider Franck, whose international democratic
alternative is to create a second chamber in the U.N.G.A., popularly elected with
representatives (of different numbers, for proportionality) from each nation. 158
For Franck, electing one representative per nation smacks of unfairness, since
larger nations receive the same attention given to very small nations. Instead, he
proposes an "allocation of seats corresponding generally, if not absolutely, to
population size, in the same way as do many democratic nations at the domestic
level" (who vote on the basis of "weighted voting"). 159 This approach is directly
inspired, as Franck admits, by the way some domestic democracies allocate seats,
increasing the number of seats for a particular district or region if its population
is higher than other ones in the nation."6 While Franck's approach might create
international democracy, it triggers new, perhaps even dangerous problems, pri-
marily because nations represented in a single assembly differ from Franck's ar-
tificial "districts." Consider how smaller nations will allege that their culture is
being determined by the decisions of larger nations,16' exemplified in the Danes'
reactions to EU Directives.
156. See BARKUN, supra note 8, at 11.
157. See id.
158. See FAIRNESS IN IN TERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 479-80, 483-84.
159. Id. Consider Canada and the United States, which each have federal systems that are in-




Perhaps contemplating the question of international democracy requires us
to move away, even for a while, from national systems and metaphors of democ-
racy as Weiler suggests in his writings.62 Again, what is being sought is an ap-
proach or structure that permits and induces communication linking the citizen
populations of nations. If this communication is achieved, the bifurcation prob-
lem would be lifted. But it is also crucial to remember that the ability of nations
to create relationships with one another through deliberation processes must not
be achieved at the expense of smaller nations, whose participation in a demo-
cratic institution at the international level puts their political and cultural auton-
omy at risk.
But, what exactly is required to lift the bifurcation between nations? A bi-
furcation, as explained above, occurs not only when citizens operate in a state-
centric model, wherein they are required to intermediate their concerns through
state officials. Even democratic models such as the one suggested by Held 63 con-
tain a type of bifurcation: Populations of nations are expected to vote for a repre-
sentative that they want, without necessarily considering the concerns, values,
problems, and aspirations of other citizens abroad. In other words, there is a
sharp separation between the populations of each nation-each population's
voice" is not heard by the other. They therefore have a greater likelihood of
sending representatives who are not sensitive to the concerns and issues of other
nations, thereby potentially exacerbating polarization and inducing disagree-
ment. People are reasonable and once they consider proposals that could serve
the interests of both nations, they would likely find ways to compromise and rec-
oncile their mutual interests and values."6 However, if elected representatives
were from a single nation, the options would likely be skewed toward the con-
cerns, interests, values, and aspirations of only that nation. This would in turn
make it difficult for the representative to compromise, which is essential if the
goal is to develop shared understandings between populations.
Hence, in order to foster shared understandings which would protect the
cultural and political autonomy of nations, politics at the international level
would have carried out differently. To do this, it becomes important to change
the one representative per nation, or the one nation, one vote principle.
162. WEILER,supra note 8, at 279.
163. See Held,supra note 103, at 40-41.
164. See generally Brunn&e & Toope,supra note 143 (describing how citizens tend to abide by rea-
sonable things that are asked of them).
TOWARD GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
While most scholars see either of these ideas as part of their models of inter-
national institutional democracy, there is no need to be so confined. Of course,
for scholars such as Held, the idea of one nation, one representative is deliberate,
and is meant to ensure equality between nations. But although equality can be
defined as the adoption of a single representative from every nation, it is also pos-
sible to define equality as having two voices of equal strength in a single person-
in other words, two cultural identities are simultaneously represented in the
same representative. In the era of hyphenated identities,165 migration, and multi-
culturalism, it is common for people to participate simultaneously in two or
more cultures, national or otherwise. This is consistent with international rela-
tions constructivists' position that "constructed actor identities are not mono-
lithic; actors may maintain and foster multiple, though typically overlapping,
identities166 depending upon the pattern of interactions into which they enter."'67
Indeed, this type of equality is consistent with democracy, because funda-
mentally, as Cohen and Habermas point out, democracy is "voice," and is based
on interpersonal communication. There is nothing that necessarily requires that
international democracy consist of national representatives, each elected by their
respective nations' populations. Instead, more imaginative approaches are pos-
sible, which include having one representative represent two nations simulta-
neously, what I refer to as the "One Representative, Two Nations" principle. In
fact, it can be argued that even in national democracies, representatives express
two voices or identities. Consider how United States Senators represent their
states, yet also determine the fate of the nation as a whole. Each of these federal
representatives not only represents the larger nation, but also decides the fate of
the local geographic district from which she was elected. These identities are
fused in the minds of the representatives and are part of their agency. The rep-
resentative balances and reconciles the needs of her district with those of the na-
tion as a whole. This undoubtedly requires creativity on the part of the
165. Examples of hyphenated identities include identities such as Canadian-Italian, or Muslim-
Frenchman, etc.
166. For explanations of identities, see for example, Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States
Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG 391, 398 (1992); SANDEL, supra
note 143, at 15-65, 130-31 (2d ed. 1998); Emanuel Adler, Imagined (Security) Communities: Cogni-
tive Regions in International Relations, 26 MILLENIUM J. INT'L STUD. 249 (1997) (using the term
"multiplicity of allegiances").
167. Brunn&e & Toope,supra note 143, at 31.
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representative, and an ability to examine and discern the different interests of
the distinctive regions.
In the same way that this occurs at the domestic level for U.S. Senators, it is
possible for an international democratic institution or institutions to contain rep-
resentatives elected by two nations simultaneously. In other words, each repre-
sentative has voices belonging to two nations and she represents both nations.
B. Simultaneous Voting: An Explanation
If representatives have two voices, how are they democratically selected? As
stated above, representatives are not selected on the one nation, one representa-
tive principle, but on the one representative, two nations principle. But, how
does the voting system operate, such that representatives represent two nations
simultaneously?
Representatives represent two nations simultaneously because both nations
vote simultaneously for the same slate of candidates. The candidate who receives
the highest number of votes of both nations becomes the elected candidate, and
will serve, as a representative for both nations.
For example, consider the case of a person, a Canadian national citizen and
resident, who wishes to serve both Canada and Germany-he feels that he un-
derstands German issues and learned German as a second language while at
university.168 To serve both nations, he must run in an election linking Canada
and Germany 169-an election in which all citizens of voting age of both coun-
tries have a right to participate-and win the greatest number of votes over all
other candidates running.
C. Citizens of Nations are the Voters in Elections
Again, it is important to emphasize that those who vote for representatives
are the citizen populations of nations. In the electoral race, which includes
168. This is a purely hypothetical example of a person who is interested in running for elections
at an international level. It does not represent any formal qualifications required to run. For ex-
ample, a person may not even speak German, and nonetheless be elected by the German people.
169. When we use the word elections "between," I mean that both nations' citizens are partici-
pating in electing a particular candidate from the same slate of candidates.
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Germany and Canada, the populations of Germany and Canada simultaneously
vote for one of the many candidates running for the Germany-Canada seat.
This election process enhances communication between the populations of
nations and lifts the bifurcation that exists in the current state-centric system.
The populations of nations would be able to communicate with one another
without the veil of state-centrism separating them from each other. Before elect-
ing a candidate to represent their mutual national populations, they would have
to communicate with and listen to the concerns of other national populations,
and perhaps even come to resolutions and determine a shared future course.
This is not to say that such an approach induces a republican-style identity link-
ing separate national populations. Instead, the populations of different nations
would relate on the basis of a civic or political association17 ° to preserve each
other's goals and aspirations (as per their particular conceptions of legitimacy),
without infringing, or infringing as little as possible, on the cultural autonomy
of one another. In other words, this interactive process allows the populations of
nations to potentially develop shared understandings. But in addition, it also af-
fords the opportunity for separate national populations to forge relationships,
which might allow them to identify with one another, even if it is a narrower
form of identification when compared to the level and degree of identification at
a national level (as represented by a republican conception of democracy). These
new identities would likely be relational identities, and not identities that aspire
for cultural or political unity. Instead, identification between different national
populations would likely amount to respect for comity. This form of identifica-
tion, although certainly not as strong as republican notions of solidarity and col-
lective identification, is also likely to support the development of future laws and
mutual regimes, thereby further reinforcing democracy.
The "governed" in this case consists of the populations of both nations, who
together, during the pre-election campaigns, engage one another and deliberate.
This allows three inter-related dynamics to emerge. First, this might result in
greater rapprochement between the two peoples, who would likely communi-
cate in a deliberative manner as they mutually select candidates. Second, the rep-
resentative who undergoes the campaign experience would likely learn the
interests and values of both nations that she intends to represent, and find ways
to reconcile them. Third, the candidate that is elected would be expected to
170. See WEILE.,supra note 72, at 324, 351-53.
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continue this process of reconciling the values and interests of the nations that
she represents, if she wishes to be re-elected.
Furthermore, laws created by representatives elected by two national popu-
lations would likely reflect the popular consent of the participating nations. The
laws would therefore likely be perceived as legitimate because they would rep-
resent a reconciliation of the nations' values and interests. In other words, na-
tional populations would likely see the law as "ask[ing] for reasonable things."'171
D. Toward the Adoption of One International Assembly Per Nation: Changing
"All Nations, One General Assembly" to "One Nation, One Assembly"
But having representatives elected from two nations, although important, is
not by itself sufficient to constitute an institutional design. Such representatives
should arguably be elected to a mega-state assembly, as part of the development
of a world demos. But, as discussed above, this is inappropriate, and perhaps un-
realistic. Indeed, although having representatives elected from two nations helps
preserve cultural autonomy in a hypothetical democratic international institu-
tion, it does not go far enough. To further protect the cultural and political au-
tonomy of nations, while affording their populations opportunities to
communicate and relate directly with one another, another design principle is
required-the principle of "One Nation, One Assembly" to replace the com-
monly held principle of "All Nations, One General Assembly."
Almost all proposals by contemporary international democratic scholars see
the inclusion of all nations' representatives in a single body-what I refer to as
the "All Nations, One General Assembly" principle. This principle is inappro-
priate, since it increases the potential for polarization of views, disagreement,
and potentially results in the silencing of less powerful nations. Also, it does not
lift the bifurcation, because the populations of nations do not inter-relate directly
with one another, but rather through the intermediate of an elected representa-
tive. This means that the population of nation X has not necessarily considered
and heard the concerns of nation Y before selecting a particular representative.
In addition to the issue I have presented, there is a second issue, of technical
importance, which is, if a potential representative is elected by two nations'




populations, then in what institutional structures are they represented? Let us
consider the mega-state assembly for the 191 states in the world for the sake of
demonstrating the difficulties associated with this issue at a technical level. Since
each nation would jointly elect one representative with each other nation, this
implies that each nation sends 190 joint representatives. When one then totals all
the nations together, this comes to a net of 191 times 190, or 36,290 representa-
tives. Clearly, adopting a system with a single assembly is highly inappropriate,
but there is another approach, which solves this problem of cumbersome num-
bers, while simultaneously furthering the goal of preserving nations' autono-
mies: the "one nation, one general assembly" principle.
I propose to replace the "All Nations, One General Assembly" principle
with the "One Nation, One General Assembly" principle. The "One Nation,
One General Assembly" principle stands for the idea that each nation possesses
an assembly with representatives elected in the process described above: Each as-
sembly contains 191 representatives elected from the nation where the assembly
is located, with each jointly elected by another nation. But, let us put the election
process aside for now, which will have to be the subject of a follow-up article.
Until now, the literature on international democracy has consistently as-
sumed, probably as a result of the "statal" orientation enunciated by Weiler, or
what Barkun, more precisely, refers to as the national analogy, that all nations of
the world ought to be represented in a single body wherein representatives vote
on different issues. But, why not have an assembly in each nation with represen-
tatives elected both by the population of the nation and another nation (like the
first principle discussed in Part III.A.). Considering that there are 191 nations,
there would be 191 representatives in each assembly.
By having an assembly in each nation, this, in addition to solving the techni-
cal issue of size, allows representatives to live, see, and feel the needs of the na-
tion in which they reside, thereby further allowing them to understand the
issues, and producing the effect of inducing reconciliation. But more impor-
tantly, it affords the opportunity for each representative to be elected by the
population of their own nation as well as the population of another nation. Each
representative in the assembly would seek to find ways to reconcile the needs,
values, and interests of the two nations from which they were elected. This
mechanism would also allow the population of one nation to communicate with
another nation's population through the election process. This would undoubt-
edly lift the bifurcation, since nations are simultaneously voting for a candidate
to mutually represent them.
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E. Design Proposals Wanted: Toward Institutional Completion
Of course, even when taken together, these design proposals are minimal.
They are meant to provide an idea about how international democracy could be
designed. Of course, to complete the institution design, many more proposals
are necessary. My hope is that by outlining some preliminary design proposals, I
have opened the doors of academia to a new research agenda of international in-
stitutional democratic design.
This research agenda includes many questions that require answers. First,
how long should each representative serve in this assembly? Then, what are the
potential interactive effects between such an assembly and domestic States struc-
tures? What are the potential effects of the structure on representatives in any
single assembly? What are the number of electoral races between national pop-
ulations? Which representatives serve in the assembly? How are votes tabulated
and how are winners selected? How do laws become binding? Are laws based
on force or on persuasion? Of course, there are many more additional questions
to consider about designing an international democratic institution-a discus-
sion I welcome and encourage.
CONCLUSION
Globalization has inaugurated a period of interdependencies, both positive
and negative. This has in turn consolidated the destinies of nation-states. In-
deed, the realization that the fates of nation-states are increasingly intercon-
nected triggers questions about whether the global system is legitimate-and if
not, why it is not.
The response to this latter question is inspired by the realization that inter-
dependencies cannot be prevented, given Strauss' notion of bifurcation, in
which national populations are divided from one another. This can be seen as a
design flaw-an architectural defect of the global system.
To deal with this design flaw called bifurcation, my project contemplates re-
designing the global system in ways that take into account the everyday realities
of nation-to-nation interdependencies. I admit that design is complicated, requir-
ing one to think about varieties of alternatives, each with their own pros and cons,
and each having different effects. My goal in this article however was to show, or
rather, to hint how it might be possible to overcome or neutralize the bifurcation
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between national populations by making some institutional design proposals. By
making these proposals, I hope to stimulate further research in the area.
Considering that interdependencies seem to exist, it becomes crucial to exam-
ine the possibilities available for structural global change. Also, I should say that
talking about interdependencies as a concept is more useful than globalization-
globalization might not be a fact, considering that a nation might not want to em-
brace its offerings. On the other hand, interdependencies-whether or not caused
by this thing called 'globalization'-exist, and to control them requires mutual ac-
tion on the part of nations and their populations. The overall goal, then, is for the
population of nations to communicate with one another, thereby inducing greater
possibilities of listening, of learning, and of decision making, with the hopeful re-
sult of yielding mutually effective solutions to the globe's nascent problems.
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